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ARTICLES
LEGAL PATERNITY (AND OTHER PARENTHOOD)
AFTER LEHR AND MICHAEL H.
Jeffrey A. Parness* and Zachary Townsend**
I. INTRODUCTION

A

CTUAL genetic ties do not always establish, or even help to establish,
legal paternity, that is, male parental rights and/or duties under law as
of the time of birth, for children born of consensual sex. Paternity status is
typically governed by state law and is often dependent upon the marital status of
the mothers or the non-sex acts of men preconception, prebirth, or shortly after
birth. For example, husbands of mothers are usually deemed parents under law
at birth, often because genetic ties are presumed. Such marital presumptions
typically arise where marriages predate conception, although some also operate
when the marriage postdates birth. These presumptions can even operate when
the marriage has effectively, though not legally, ended before conception. It is
not unusual for a husband to be the presumed legal parent of a child born as a
result of sex with his wife when the husband in fact had nothing to do with
conception (though a presumption is less typical if the child was born via
artificial insemination). Thus, for nonmarital children born to certain married
women, legal paternity designations are often not founded on actual genetic ties.
The public policy at work here is arguably sensible, as intact marriages will
frequently be preserved by disallowing adulterous genetic fathers the opportunity
to intrude. Settled, and often loving, family relations continue even after the
discovery (often years after birth) of the lack of a husband's genetic ties. Marital
paternity presumptions make sense, as they are easily applied and promote the
governmental interests of having two parents for children born because of sex.
Yet these presumptions adversely impact genetic fathers.
Similarly, actual male genetic ties may not lead to legal paternity when
children are born to unmarried women because of sex. Again preconception,
prebirth, or at birth conduct may be important. The 1983 United States Supreme
Court decision Lehr v. Robertson recognizes that American states can require
*
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natural fathers,' at least in the adoption setting, to do more than prove genetic ties
in order to acquire parental opportunities involving their nonmarital children.2
When such fathers perform sufficiently beyond simply proving genetic ties, they
acquire "substantial" federal constitutional child-rearing interests so that any
proposed adoption requires their consent. 3 When such fathers do not do enough,
Lehr allows states to deny them legal parentage.4 While the U.S. Constitution
under Lehr forbids states from omitting too many natural fathers from
governmental protection of parental interests,5 Lehr does not forbid a state, at
least within adoption, from imbuing a man with no genetic ties with legal
paternity for a nonmarital child born of sex. Within adoption, and elsewhere,
states often recognize a nongenetic father's child-rearing interests in nonmarital
children, such as holding children out as their own. Many American states, in
fact, say that genetic ties alone are an insufficient basis for legal paternity.
Indeed, some states require much more.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said little since Lehr about male parentage for
nonmarital children born of sex to unmarried mothers, in or outside of adoption.
It has, however, spoken on legal paternity for children of married mothers whose
husbands are not the genetic fathers-a different form of nonmarital children.6 In
the 1989 case Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court recognized that states could
create an irrebuttable presumption of genetic ties in the husband for a child born
during a marriage if the marriage remains intact for some time after birth and if
the married couple chooses to raise the child. 7 However, many states choose not
to employ irrebuttable presumptions, potentially giving adulterous natural fathers
Lehr interests.
After a review of the Lehr and Michael H. decisions, this article next
considers whether the Lehr guidelines have been properly followed in and
outside of adoption, including safe haven, and custody and visitation settings.
We also review American paternity laws affecting child support, torts, and
inheritance, where male child-rearing is not always at issue. Along the way, this
article explores the possible expansion of Lehr's child-rearing opportunity
interests, in children born of sex, to those uninvolved in the sex. As part of this
1. We employ natural fathers, genetic fathers and biological fathers synonymously-with
each usually contemplating births resulting from consensual sex. Similarly, natural, genetic and
biological mothers typically are female parents whose children are born of their own sexual
conduct.
2. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983).
3. See id at 257-58 (Federal constitutional childrearing rights are grounded in the liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clauses.).
4. Id. at 262.
5. Id. at 263-64 (If a statutory adoption scheme was "likely to omit many responsible fathers,
and if qualification for notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be
thought procedurally inadequate."). See also Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads:
Out of Control Paternity Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 641, 649 (2008) [hereinafter Parness, Out of
Control Paternity Schemes] (criticizing under Lehr many state adoption (and safe haven and
paternity acknowledgment) schemes).
6. These children are, at times, called "quasi-marital." Nevitt v. Bonomo, 53 So. 3d 1078,
1084 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
7. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119 (1989).
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exploration, we posit that Lehr has often been misread, in and outside of
adoption, thus denying many natural fathers their federal constitutional
opportunity interests in rearing their children. We conclude that Lehr rights
should be expanded to biological fathers outside adoption and to certain
nongenetic parents, both women and men. We further conclude that the policy
analyses in Lehr and Michael H. should sometimes be considered in cases
involving no federal constitutional interests.
II. THE LEHR DECISION
In Lehr, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that most genetic fathers are eligible
for federal constitutional child-rearing interests in adoption proceedings
involving their nonmarital children born of sex. 8 These interests are secured
when the men take advantage of their paternity opportunities by timely
establishing "significant custodial, personal or financial" relationships with their
genetic offspring. 9 Unfortunately, neither Lehr nor later U.S. Supreme Court
precedents fully describe how or when these paternity interests may be
successfully executed. As a result, there are now significant interstate
differences, subjecting many men not only to uncertainties, but also to procedural
pitfalls constituting "the sheerest formalism.'" Thus, courts read Lehr to allow
states to deny genetic fathers parental child-rearing interests, even when their
failures in establishing parent-child relationships were caused by "ignorance" of
"grudging and crabbed" legal doctrines."1 Lehr has even been read to permit
such denials when
mothers concealed the "whereabouts" of children from the
12
genetic fathers.
A detailed examination of Lehr demonstrates how the Supreme Court has
permitted states to establish legal disconnects between genetic ties and legal
paternity in adoptions. In Lehr, the story of Jessica Martz's birth to an unmarried
couple, Lorraine and Jonathan, is "far different" depending upon the storyteller. 3
In Lehr, the six-Justice majority relied
on Lorraine's story, while the three
4
dissenters chiefly heard Jonathan's.
The majority, through Justice Stevens, focused on Jessica, Lorraine and
Richard, who had married Lorraine eight months after Jessica's birth.' 5 The case
originated when Richard filed a petition to adopt Jessica shortly after her second
birthday. 16 Jonathan contested the adoption, arguing that he was entitled to, but
8. See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. 248. There is no indication in Lehr (or later Supreme Court
decisions) that such interests arise for genetic fathers of children born of nonconsensual sex. See
id. Lower courts differ on such interests for men engaged in certain forms of statutory rape. See,
e.g., Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996).
9. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
10. Id. at 273-75 (White, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 274-75 (White, J., dissenting).
12. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269 (1983).
13. Id.at 270.
14. See id.

15. Id. at 248.
16. Id.
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not given, advance notice of (and a chance to be heard at) the adoption
proceeding. 7 New York law entitled a genetic father of a child born to an
unmarried woman to notice (assuming he had not abandoned the child) 18 only if
he had his name listed on "the putative father registry"; if he had been earlier
adjudicated the father; if he was either "identified as the father on the child's
birth certificate" or "identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written
statement"; if he had married the mother before the child was six months old; or
if he had lived "openly" with the child and the child's mother while holding
himself out as the child's father.' 9 Though conceding he did not meet any of
these criteria, Jonathan urged that "special circumstances gave him a
constitutional right to notice and a hearing before Jessica was adopted" by
Richard. 20 The special circumstances included a "visitation and paternity
petition" filed by Jonathon a month after the adoption proceeding began, but
more than a month before Jonathan learned of the adoption petition. ' Four days
after learning of the pending adoption, Jonathan sought a stay so that his
The adoption court judge responded to
paternity case could proceed. 2
Jonathan's request by telephone, explaining that an adoption order had been
signed earlier that same day.23 While the judge was aware of Jonathan's pending
paternity petition, 24 and Lorraine and Richard had known of the paternity petition
for roughly two weeks,25 the adoption court judge concluded that no notice to
Jonathan was required
because, as Jonathan conceded, none of the statutory
26
criteria had been met.

Two New York appellate courts sustained the adoption. The New York
high court affirmed largely because it found that the lack of notice to Jonathan

17. Id.

18. Id. at 266-68 ("[Where] one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child
and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights."). See, e.g.,
In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772, 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (holding that the New
York adoption statute's differential treatment regarding notice to fathers and mothers did not offend
equal protection); In re Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378, 381 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979).
19. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. See also Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, at *16 (citing ARK.
CODE § 9-9-207(a)( 11), requiring that, to receive an adoption notice, a listing on the Putative Father
Registry must be accompanied by the establishment of a significant custodial, personal or financial
parent-child relationship).
20. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252.
21. Id.
22. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 252 (1983).
23. Id. at 253.
24. Id. See also In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 430 N.E.2d 896, 898 (N.Y. 1981). The family
court judge of Ulster County knew of Jonathan's pending paternity petition, because the same
"Family Court Judge in Ulster County signed an order to show cause returnable March 12, 1979
(the return date in the ... proceeding) bringing on the mother's application to change the venue of
the paternity proceeding from Westchester to Ulster County." Id.
25. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252.
26. Id. at 253.
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made no difference,2 7 saying that a notice of an adoption proceeding is intended
to afford a genetic father the chance "to provide the [adoption] court with
York court
the New Y
evidence concerning the best interest of the child. ,,28 Here, thNe
concluded that Jonathan had "made no tender indicating any ability to provide
any particular or special information relevant to Jessica's best interest.

'29

Of

course, if Jonathan was a father (or perhaps even a potential father) under law,
Jessica normally could not be adopted over Jonathan's objection simply because
it was in Jessica's best interest to live elsewhere.30 Parental rights (and interests)
are not lost simply because others would better rear the child.
The issues before the U.S. Supreme Court included "whether the New York
statutes are unconstitutional because they inadequately protect the natural
relationship between parent and child" or because they draw "an impermissible
distinction between the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.", 31 On
this relationship, a majority of the Court distinguished between an unwed genetic
father who had formed a "significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with his child, thereby acquiring "substantial" federal constitutional
child-rearing interests, and an unwed genetic father who had not yet formed such
a relationship, who possessed a less weighty federal constitutional interest in
forming such a relationship, at least while the mother was not married to
another.32 The Lehr Court found that Jonathan had formed no such relationship
with Jessica and, in33fact, had not sought "to establish a legal tie until after she
was two years old.",

The Court then assessed whether New York had "adequately protected"
Jonathan's opportunity to form a parent-child relationship with Jessica,34 finding
it adequate. 3 The Court deemed sufficient the New York statutory conditions,
observing that "the right to receive notice was completely within" Jonathan's
control-he simply needed to mail a postcard to the putative father registry. 36
Jonathan's ignorance of this requirement was no defense.37 The Court rejected
Jonathan's plea that his case was "special" because both the adoption court and
27. See generally id. The New York high court did acknowledge "that it might have been
prudent to give notice" to Jonathan. Id. at 244.
28. Id. at 254.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 266 ("The legislation at issue in this case ... guarantees to certain people the right to
veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding.").
31. Id. at 255 n. 10. The Lehr majority also indicated that "the question presented is whether
New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried father's inchoate relationship" in a manner
consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
248.
32. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1983).
33. Id. at 262.
34. Id. at 262-63.
35. Id. at 265 ("Since the New York statutes adequately protected appellant's inchoate interest
in establishing a relationship with Jessica, we found no merit in the claim that his constitutional
rights were offended.").
36. Id. at 248.
37. Id. at 264 ("[I]gnorance of the law cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law
itself.").
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the mother knew of his pending paternity petition before the adoption order was
entered. 38 The Court noted that requiring strict compliance with the statutory
criteria served the public interest in facilitating adoptions of young children
expeditiously 39 and that such a requirement was fair here because Jonathan was
"presumptively capable of asserting and protecting" his own rights.40 Like the
courts below, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that Jonathan was at least partly
at fault for failing to intervene in Richard Robertson's adoption petition,"
effectively reasoning that Jonathan could not sleep on his parental opportunity
rights after having slept with Lorraine.
Regarding the distinction that New York lawmakers drew between maternal
and paternal interests, the Court recognized the need for the distinction to serve a
conceivable "legitimate governmental objective.,A2
New York adoption
procedures distinguished between women and men who were genetic parents by
allowing all genetic mothers, but not all genetic fathers, "the right to veto an
adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding.A 3 These
gender distinctions were said to serve the objectives of promoting the best
interests of the children and of securing prompt and final adoptions of
"illegitimate" (nonmarital or out-of-wedlock) children by allowing veto and
participation rights only to those genetic parents who had established "custodial,
personal, or financial" relationships with their children. 4 5 Genetic moms, but not
dads, always initially had such established relationships. 45 The Court found that
New York law sufficiently recognized genetic fathers who participated in childrearing, noting that the statutory scheme did not likely "omit many responsible

38. The Lehr Court did not address whether a different outcome was warranted if Richard
Robertson knew about Jonathan's pending paternity action. See generally In re Martz, 423
N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979). Lorraine was served with notice of Jonathan's action. Id. at
384. Further, Lorraine and Richard were both represented by the same counsel, from the state trial
court to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id at 382. Nonetheless, the trial court found that there was
no proof that Richard had actual notice of Jonathan's petition for paternity and that "[a]ny basis for
the imputation of the wife's knowledge to the husband has to rest upon the marital relationship
alone which is wholly insufficient." Id at 384. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Jonathan's
motion to vacate Jessica's adoption, because "the only significant inquiry" was whether Richard
had actual knowledge of Jonathan's pending paternity petition. Id.
39. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 253 n.6 (without trying to intervene in the adoption proceeding, Jonathan could not
appeal the adoption order). See also In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 430 N.E. 2d 896, 901-02 n.7
(N.Y. 1981) ("[The father] could have made a prompt application to intervene in the adoption
proceeding once notice of its pendency was brought to his attention."); Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 383
("[A]t no time prior to this motion did the putative father of the child attempt to intervene in the
proceeding as he might have done.").
42. Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 265-67 (1983).
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id. at 267-68.
45. ld at 266.
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fathers, 46 and did not necessarily estop genetic fathers who failed to step up for
reasons beyond their control.47
In contrast to the majority, the Lehr dissenters focused on the story told by
Jonathan, resulting in a very different approach to the adequacy of the protections
afforded Jonathan's "natural relationship" with Jessica. 48 According to Jonathan
(whose account was never subject to an evidentiary hearing), Jonathan and
Lorraine cohabited "for approximately [two] years until Jessica's birth," during
which time the two were engaged to be married. 49 During that time, Lorraine50
acknowledged to friends and relatives that Jonathan was Jessica's father.
Lorraine later reported that Jonathan was the father of Jessica to the New York
State Department of Social Services when she sought public aid. 51 Evidently
(and unfortunately for Jonathan), there was no "sworn written statement" of
this.52
Jonathan "visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital every day during
Lorraine's confinement. 5 3 Upon discharge from the birth hospital in November,
1976, through August, 1977, Lorraine largely concealed her whereabouts from
Jonathan, though he was able to sporadically locate Lorraine and visit Jessica "to
the extent" Lorraine was willing to permit it. 54 From August 1977 until August
1978, Jonathan was unable to locate Lorraine and Jessica, though he never ceased
looking for them. 55 Jonathan did locate them again in August, 1978, "with the
aid of a detective agency. 5 6 It was then that he first learned of Lorraine's
marriage to Richard." Jonathan offered financial assistance and a trust fund for
Jessica, but Lorraine refused the offer. 58 Lorraine also rejected Jonathan's
request to visit Jessica, threatening Jonathan "with arrest unless he stayed

46. Id. at 263-64.
47. Id. at 264 ("[Jonathan's] right to receive notice was completely within appellant's
control."). Where state statutes omit "responsible fathers," the fathers' lack of statutory standing
can be challenged under Lehr. See, e.g., Venable v. Parker, 706 S.E.2d 211, 214 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011) (Dillard, J., concurring) ("As I understand it, our decision leaves open for another day
whether a putative biological father might, in certain circumstances, have standing to ask a court to
compel genetic testing-before or contemporaneous with the filing of a motion challenging a
judgment of paternity-based upon a constitutional right to familial relations with the child,
notwithstanding the lack of any statutory authority for doing so.").
48. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-69.
49. Id. Appellant's Brief indicates that Lorraine and Robert were engaged when Jessica was in
utero, but the Authors have found no recognition of their engagement in any of the Lehr opinions.
Brief for the Appellant at 12, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756), 1982 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 219, at *12.
50. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269.
51. Id.
52. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1983).
53. Id.at 269.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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away." 59 Thereupon, Jonathan retained counsel who wrote to Lorraine early in
December, 1978, requesting visitation for Jonathan and threatening legal action.6 °
This was closely followed by Richard's adoption petition, filed on December 21,
1978,61 and Jonathan's visitation and paternity petition, filed early in 1979.62
With this "far different picture, 63 the dissenters concluded "that but for the
actions" of Lorraine, Jonathan accepted fatherhood and gained veto and
participation rights in any adoption proceeding. 64 They looked to a 1980
statutory amendment in New York requiring that consent to adoption be obtained
from a genetic father who was "prevented" from establishing a significant parentchild relationship by the genetic mother or another "having lawful custody of the
child., 65 They concluded that blood ties, together with interference with the
sufficient to
inquiring genetic father who actually parented for some time,
66 were
prompt adoption notice and participation rights for Jonathan.
The dissenters went further, suggesting adoption proceeding rights might
even arise for genetic fathers without interference. They hinted that a "mere
biological relationship" between a child born to an unwed mother and the genetic
"a protected interest" for the genetic
father might itself be enough to prompt
6
father under federal constitutional law.
The dissenters also concluded that Jonathan's paternity case was so
comparable to the explicit statutory criteria prompting notice and veto rights that
the judicial failure to recognize Jonathan's effective compliance with the statute
amounted to the "sheerest formalism," serving no legitimate governmental
interests either regarding the children's best interests or in expeditious and final
adoptions. 68 The dissent suggested that there are Equal Protection difficulties
with statutory distinctions between genetic mothers and genetic fathers "who
have made themselves known. 69 That is, it may be improper to distinguish
between fathers who have formally acknowledged paternity under some, but not
other, governmental schemes, since all schemes generally serve the purpose of
designating fathers at birth.70 While Jonathan had not listed his name on the
state's putative father registry, his name was known to a state social service
agency; he filed a paternity action before the adoption order; and his efforts to
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 252 (1983).

63. Id.at 270 (White, J., dissenting).
at 271.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 271 n.3.
66. Id.at 271-73.
67. Id.at 271-72.
68. Id.at 275. Similarly, when the New York high court addressed Jonathan's motion to
vacate Jessica's adoption, a dissenter explained that "[t]o say in the face of the actual knowledge of
the judge that petitioner could have protected his rights by filing a notice of intent to claim
paternity is to require the performance of a meaningless act." In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 430
dissenting).
N.E.2d 896, 904 (Cooke, J.,
69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275 (White, J., dissenting).

70. Id.
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71
locate his daughter might be deemed significant if there was ever a hearing.
rather than on
The dissent focused more on what Jonathan did to parent Jessica
72
his failure to register his name with some faceless bureaucrat.
Finally, the three dissenters observed, that states could better ensure
participation by genetic fathers in adoption proceedings by requiring unwed
genetic mothers "to divulge" the names of genetic fathers.73 They remarked that
states could even do so when it is the spouse of the genetic mother (like Richard
Robertson) who seeks adoption, at least when the marriage followed the birth and
the husband had no marital presumption. 74 The dissent noted that unwed mothers
are already required to identify genetic fathers of children born of sex in
comparable settings, as when public aid is sought by mothers on behalf of their
children. In fact, Lorraine had reported Jonathan as the genetic father to a state
social services agency when she sought public aid.7 6 Under federal public aid
laws, Lorraine had a "good faith" cooperative duty to name the genetic father of
the child for whom she sought assistance.77 As with public aid, voluntary
termination of parental rights and placement for adoption are governmental
benefits that may require good faith maternal cooperation.78

III. THE MICHAEL H. DECISION
Since Lehr, the U.S. Supreme Court has said little about the paternity
opportunity interests of unwed genetic fathers of nonmarital children born of sex
either within or outside of adoption. However, it has said that such interests need
not be afforded unwed fathers in child custody/visitation settings when the
children are born to women married to other men.
In Michael H. v. GeraldD., four U.S. Supreme Court Justices found that an
extant marital relationship, coupled with an established parent-child relationship,
can trump biological ties. 80 In this "extraordinary" case, 81 Carole D. and Gerald
71. Id. at 271, 274-75 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
72. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269-76 (1983).
73. Id. at 273 n.5. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45A-715(b) (West 2011) ("[Adoption
petitions] shall set forth with specificity ... the names, dates of birth and addresses of the parents of
the child, if known, including the name of any putative father named by the mother.").
74. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 273 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). A postbirth marriage to a nongenetic
father can prompt what is or looks like a paternity presumption for the husband. At the time of
Jessica's proposed adoption, "persons entitled to notice" included certain persons "married to the
child's mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child." See, e.g., id. at 251 n.5

(citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l-a(2) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983)).
75. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 n.2.
76. Id. at 269.
77. Lorraine was legally obligated "to cooperate in good faith with the State and social services
official in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock" in order to comply with the
public aid eligibility requirements. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 369.2 (2011).
78. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 273 n.5.
79. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
80. Id. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, to which Justice Rehnquist joined in full,
and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined in all respects except for a single footnote.
81. Id. at 113.
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D. were married in 1976 and established a home in California, where they chiefly
resided together as husband and wife. 82 However, in 1978, Carole began an
adulterous affair with Michael H.8 3 In May 1981, Carole bore a child, Victoria
D. 84 Gerald was listed as the father on Victoria's birth certificate and had
"always held Victoria out to the world as his daughter,"8 5 even though shortly
86
after the birth, Carole told Michael "she believed he might be the father.,
In October 1981, Gerald moved to New York City to pursue business
interests8 7 while Carole remained in California. 88 With Gerald in New York,
Carole, Michael, and Victoria had blood tests performed in late October, 1981,
which showed that Michael almost certainly was the natural father. 89 In January
1982, when Carole visited Michael in St. Thomas, Michael "held Victoria out as
his child." 90 During the next months, Carole and Victoria lived for some time
with Gerald in New York and separately with a third man, Scott, in California. 9'
Carole and Gerald reconciled in June of 1984.92 Carole then moved to New York
93
to live with Gerald, where she had two more children born into the marriage.
After Gerald rebuffed his attempts to visit Victoria, in November 1982,
Michael sought, via a California filiation case, to establish paternity and
visitation rights. 94 California law, however, instructed that "the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively
presumed to be a child of the marriage. 95 This presumption was conclusive as to
Michael, but not as to Carole or Gerald.96 Via "blood tests," Gerald could
challenge the presumption "not later than two years" from Victoria's "date of
birth." 9 Via "blood tests," Carole could also challenge the presumption within
two years of birth, but only "if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit
with the.court acknowledging paternity of the child., 98 Michael challenged the

82. Id. They only resided together in California from May 1976 to October 1981 "when one or
the other was not out of the country on business." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 113-14.
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114 (1989) (testing revealed a 98.07% probability
that Michael was Victoria's genetic father).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 115.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 114.
95. Id. at 117 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
96. See id. at 118.
97. Id. (quoting § 621(c)).
98. Id. (quoting § 621(d)).
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statute on due-process grounds, arguing that the California statute created an
illegal irrebuttable presumption.99
In March 1983, the filiation court appointed a guardian to represent
Victoria's interests. 0 0 The guardian asserted a cross-claim, arguing that if
Victoria "had more than one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to
maintain her filial relationship, with all of the attendant rights, duties and
obligations, with both."''1
°2
In May 1983, Carole moved for summary judgment in the filiation case.
She had lived in New York with Gerald from March to July 1983. Yet in August
1983, Carole "returned to California, became involved once again with Michael,
03
and instructed her attorneys" to withdraw her summary judgment request.1
From August 1983 to April 1984, Carole and Victoria lived with Michael in
Carole's apartment in Los Angeles. 10 4 During this time Michael "held Victoria
out as his daughter."' 1 5 In April 1984, "Carole
and Michael signed a stipulation
06
that Michael was Victoria's natural father."'
Things changed again in May 1984, when "Carole left Michael" and
"instructed her attorneys not to file the stipulation.' ' 7 Also in May 1984,
Michael and Victoria "sought visitation rights for Michael pendent lite."' 8 Upon
the recommendation of a court-appointed psychologist, the court thereafter
ordered "sole custody" for Carole, with "limited visitation privileges" for
Michael. 0 9 "In June 1984, Carole reconciled with Gerald, joining him in New

99. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116 (1989). The statute has since been amended,
allowing some biological fathers to gain custody or visitation, notwithstanding a marital paternity
presumption. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 2011) ("Notwithstanding Section 7540 [defining
marital presumption], if the court finds ... the husband is not the father of the child, the question of
paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly."). See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11,

14 (Cal. 2004) (holding both husband and biological father were "presumed" natural fathers under
the Family Code and affirming custody order benefitting husband). Compare Strauser v. Stahr, 726

A.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Pa. 1999) (irrebuttable presumption of paternity in husband as long as, as

here, marriage is intact, and married couple favor maintaining the presumption), with In re
Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506, 511 (111. 2004) (notwithstanding marital presumption,

alleged biological father could demand DNA testing; little judicial guidance on when a man, with a
positive test, could obtain custody or visitation, with a nod toward General Assembly
responsibility), and J.A.S. v. Bushelman,

342 S.W.3d 850, 852-53,

859 (Ky.

2011)

(notwithstanding marital presumption, alleged genetic father can pursue a paternity case involving
child born in 2008, even where marital couple have lived together and regularly engaged in sex
since their marriage in 1999).
100. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 114.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989).
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York where they [lived] with Victoria and two other children since born into the
marriage," at least until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in June 1989.110
In October 1984, Gerald, who had intervened in Michael's case, moved for
summary judgment."' Finding the statutory criteria requiring cohabitation and
lack of impotency or sterility met, in January 1985, the motion
was granted.112 A
3
1
denied.'
was
Michael
for
request for continued visitation
The plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia relied heavily on tradition
in rejecting Michael's claim.' 1 4 In an express recognition of constitutionally
protected paternity opportunity interests, Justice Scalia quoted Lehr, writing "that
'the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possess to develop a relationship with his
offspring,' and we assumed that the Constitution might require some protection
of the opportunity.' 1 5 The opinion also found, however, that precedents,
including Lehr,'16 "rest ... upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not
be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
within the unitary family."' 17 The "unitary family" refers to the "family unit
accorded traditional respect in our society" and is typified "by the marital family,
' 18
but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children." "
Respect for family integrity can be best served by an irrebuttable presumption of
natural ties in a husband, as it promotes the preservation of the family unit."19
Justice Scalia was unclear about who constituted a unitary family. 120 After
mentioning "the marital family" and "the household of unmarried parents and
their children," he noted "[p]erhaps the concept [of the unitary family] can be
expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally
respected relationships-and will thus cease to have any constitutional
significance-if it is stretched so far."' 121 Scalia characterized the presumption of
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 115-16 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1989)).
114. Id.at 124 ("The legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship between
persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under
the historic practices of society.").
115. Id.at 128-29 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-65 (1983)).
116. The opinion expressly recognized the paternity opportunity interest in Lehr. Id. Beside
Lehr, persuasive precedents included Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Cabanv. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Michael H. at 123.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 123 n.3.
119. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (holding that "the conclusive presumption
not only expresses the State's substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the
child's paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy"). Justice Scalia did not
comment on when such a family must exist. See, e.g., Nevitt v. Bonomo, 53 So. 3d 1078, 1079
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (statutory family must be intact at time of birth).
120. See, e.g., Anthony Miller, The Casefor the Genetic Parent:Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr,
and Michael H. Revisited, 53 Loy. L. REv. 395, 440 (2007) ("Justice Scalia's 'unitary family' test
does not resolve the issue of who falls within the definition of such a family.").
121. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
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the legitimacy of a child born into a marriage as a "fundamental principle of the
common law"' 22 that could only be rebutted by "proof that a husband was
incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant
period."' 123 Justice Scalia did not similarly recognize any common-law
characterizations
regarding "the household of unmarried parents and their
124
children."'

In "consulting the most specific tradition available, ' ' 125 Justice Scalia
"found nothing ...in the older cases addressing specifically the power of the
natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing
marriage with another man."'' 26 For Michael to obtain parental rights, Justice
Scalia wrote that he must show "not that our society has traditionally allowed a
natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has
traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not
traditionally denied them."' 127 In rejecting Michael's claim, Scalia found that
where a "natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique
opportunity of the husband of the marriage ...it is not unconstitutional for the
State to give categorical preference to the latter.' 28 The Michael H. plurality
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 124 (citing
Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at

H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY 1 (1836)).

123.
128 n.6.
125.
126. Justice Scalia further stated:

Thus, itisultimately irrelevant, even for purposes of determining current social attitudes
towards the alleged substantive right Michael asserts, that the present law ina number of
States appear to allow the natural father-including the natural father who has not established
a relationship with the child-the theoretical power to rebut the marital presumption. What
counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a
child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so. This is not the stuff of
which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.
Id.at 127 (internal citations omitted). Since Lehr, there is some precedent for allowing the unwed
natural father of a marital child to gain parental fights, though there is "an extant marital union that
wishes to embrace the child." See, e.g., Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 309 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding it unconstitutional to give categorical preference to the mother's husband in
circumstances where "it cannot be reasonably contended that" the mother and husband "were
substantively a 'marital union' at the point of' the child's birth and the first year of the child's life,
or when the mother and husband are married in name only); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182,
191-92 (Iowa 1999) (holding unconstitutional a statute that limited the standing of certain putative
fathers because "due process rights of the putative father must prevail" over the state's interest of
preserving the "family unity"); Felix 0. v. Janette M., No. P-02420/04, 2010 WL 5563887, at *1314 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010) (ordering DNA tests and holding equitable estoppel operates
against married mother who allowed unwed natural father to parent).
128. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129. A majority of the Supreme Court Justices were unclear on
whether or not Michael was entitled to federal constitutional parental prerogatives. While Justice
White, joined by Justice Brennan, found Michael had "a liberty interest entitled to protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 160 (White, J., dissenting), Justice
Stevens, who concurred with Justice Scalia in the judgment, said he "would not foreclose the
possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and his child might
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said that states are free to give categorical preference to mothers' husbands over
biological fathers, 29 reasoning that "to provide protection to an adulterous
natural father is to deny protection to a marital father." 3° The extent to which a
husband's paternity opportunity interest can entitle him to protection over a
mother's objection remains unclear. While the plurality called the opportunity of
a mother's husband "similarly unique" to the opportunity interest of the natural
father, it did not explain how this "similarly unique" opportunity relates to the
family unit.13 1 Nor did the plurality elaborate on family units "accorded
traditional 132respect," including households of "unmarried parents and their
children."'

Thus Justice Scalia recognized that legal and nonlegal ties with the mother
can be allowed by states to negatively impact the parental opportunities of the
unwed natural father. Scalia did say that in "some circumstances the actual
relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father
paternal interest comparable to those of the married father."'' 33 He recognized
that a categorical preference for the husband may be rejected by'a state, as when
the marital couple does not wish to raise the child as its own.
Justice Scalia
concluded that "the absence of a legal tie with the mother" for the unwed natural
father, and a tie between her and another (i.e., via marriage), can, under state law,
''appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might
otherwise exist[]" for the unwed natural father.' 35
Other Justices rejected the Scalia reasoning. In a special concurrence,
Justice Stevens said that he "would not foreclose" the possibility "that a natural
father might even have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship
with a child whose mother was married to and cohabitating with another man at

exist." Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, declared there was "a constitutionally protected interest." Id.at 151 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
129. It is unclear whether any U.S. state adoption law requires a conclusive, irrebuttable
presumption of paternity. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).
130. Id. at 130.
131. Id.at 129.
132. Id.at 123 n.3. The lack of clarity regarding nonmarital "family units" in Michael H. has
left state courts to their own devices. See, e.g., C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 373 (Mass. 1990)
(holding the biological father of a child born to an extant marital family can proceed with a
paternity action, because if "the putative father can demonstrate that he has enjoyed a substantial
relationship with the child, then his interest warrants protection and the interest in protecting a
family ...is greatly decreased."); Jack v. Jack, 796 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Tex. App. 1990) (citing
Michael H. in holding, "[W]e do not recognize that a man alleging to be the father of a child born
into a marriage has a constitutionally protected interest which would enable him to challenge the
presumption that the wife's husband is the father of the child."). See also Georgina G. v. Terry M.,
516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994) (noting natural mother and her child "form a 'unitary family"'
under Michael H.).
133. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
134. Id. at 130.
135. Id.at 129 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983)).
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137
the time of the child's conception and birth.', 13 6 While four other Justices
138
recognized Michael's federal constitutional interests in visitation with Victoria,
which would prompt the need for some kind of hearing, Justice Stevens did not
join them, finding the resolution of the constitutional issue involving Michael's
parent-child interest to be unnecessary since Michael had already been accorded,
under state law, "a fair opportunity" to show that Victoria's "interests would be
served by granting him visitation rights.' 39 Justice Stevens seconded the
plurality when he noted that if the California Evidence Code did effectively bar
Michael from acquiring a judicial paternity determination, that bar was of no
constitutional import if no legal rights were affected. 40 Incidentally, Justice
Stevens's pronouncement that the federal Constitution poses no obligation upon
states to determine paternity unless some legal right would be affected (and that
the legal right could simply involve a hearing on whether a child's interest would
be served
by a paternity determination) was unmentioned in his majority opinion
14 1
in Lehr.
In Michael H., Justice Stevens quoted the plurality, declaring "[i]t is no
conceivable denial of constitutional right for a State to decline to declare facts
unless some legal consequence hinges upon the requested declaration."'142 He did
not elaborate on what may constitute a "legal consequence." However, Justice
Scalia did, saying, "[W]e cannot grasp the concept of a 'right to a hearing' on the
part of a person who claims no substantive entitlement that the hearing will
assertedly vindicate."'' 43 Scalia added that if Michael was to "obtain a declaration

136. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring) (relying on cases like Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), and Caban, 441 U.S. at 380).
137. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White joined the
dissent.
138. Id. at 143. Michael should "prevail today" on his assertion of substantial federal due
process protection as he showed a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood as needed
under Stanley, Caban, and Lehr.
139. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 135 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (reading the
relevant state visitation statute as allowing Michael an opportunity to seek visitation).
140. Id. at 132-33.
141. See generally id. at 132-36. As such, Stevens's concurrence in Michael H. seems less
protective of a father's status of paternity than his opinion in Lehr. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262
(holding that a biological connection alone "offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses").
142. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 126. Justice Stevens did not elaborate on what would constitute a
"legal consequence"; however, a strict reading of the Lehr Court's majority opinion arguably
suggests that some legal consequence can or does hinge on a judicial declaration of natural
fatherhood. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (holding that a biological connection alone "offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses"). By this reading of Lehr, the plurality
opinion of Michael H. displaces or limits the paternal opportunity interest afforded to biological
fathers, at least where children are conceived due to adultery and then born into an extant marital
family.
143. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.5. Justice Scalia stated, "What Michael asserts here is a
right to have himself declared the natural father and thereby to obtain parentalprerogatives,"
suggesting that Michael's petition for visitation was inseverable from Michael's petition for
paternity. Id. at 126.
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as to who was the natural father, that would not advance Michael's claim[,]" as
such a declaration would not necessarily entitle him custody or visitation.14
Thus for some, a judicial declaration of who was Victoria's natural father
would not necessarily imbue in Michael any possible child-rearing interest. Yet
a declaration of who was the natural father of Victoria might advance other
interests with "some legal consequence" for Michael, including possible custody
or visitation in the event of Carole's and Gerald's death. 45 As well, wrongful
death or inheritance interests might arise for Michael upon Victoria's death.
Possible legal consequences that would likely be unwelcomed by Michael might
include child-support duties should Carole and Gerald pass, or should Gerald's
and Stevens were the only
paternity be disestablished. However, Justices Scalia 146
Justices to employ the "legal consequence" reasoning.
Other Justices commented on the plurality's historical emphasis. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy left open the question of Justice Scalia's "mode of
historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]" indicating that it may be
"somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area. ''47 Justice Brennan
criticized the plurality's approach to tradition, saying "[a]pparently oblivious to
the fact that this concept can be as malleable and elusive as 'liberty' itself, the
plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border around the
Constitution."1 48 Justice Brennan argued that the plurality failed to follow the
command of precedent but instead "reinvent[ed] the wheel" by inquiring anew as
49
to whether a parent-child relationship is one that society traditionally respects.
To Brennan, the plurality's claim, that authoritative cases, such as Lehr, intended
to protect the "unitary family," was a distortion of precedent. 5 ° Brennan argued
that according to the plurality, a unitary family cannot exist unless the mother is
married and the parents and children are living together. 15 1 Brennan suggested
that although the Lehr Court denied Jonathan the opportunity to rear his
144. Id.
at 126-27.
145. Id. at 126. A biological father with no prior custody or visitation rights, in some instances,
should be able to gain such rights upon, for example, the death of the natural mother and her
husband, especially if parental rights were never terminated and a child's best interests would be

served. See, e.g., H.S. v. N.S., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 470, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) ("[A] parent who

loses legal and/or physical custody in a family law custody proceeding is not foreclosed from
regaining custody based on changed circumstances.").
146. See generally MichaelH., 491 U.S. I10.
147. Id.at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I 10, 142 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Id.at 143.
Id.(arguing that "[t]hough it pays lipservice to the idea that marriage is not the crucial fact

in denying constitutional protection to the relationship between Michael and Victoria, the plurality
cannot mean what it says") (internal citations omitted). But see Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959,
974 (R.I. 2000) (relying on the Michael H. plurality's articulation that the marital family "also
includes the household of unmarriedparents and their children" to support its holding that a
child/nonbiological mother relationship can trump a child/biological mother relationship in a matter
involving visitation where the child was born to a same-sex domestic partnership) (emphasis
added) (citing MichaelH., 410 U.S. at 123 n.3).
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biological child on grounds independent of family preservation, "the putative
father's demands [in5 2Lehr] would have disrupted a 'unitary family' as the
plurality defines it["1
A premise underlying Brennan's criticisms is that the plurality erred in
applying substantive due process instead of procedural due process., 53 The
plurality was said to conflate "the question whether a liberty interest exists with
the question what procedures may be used to terminate or curtail it.'

54

Brennan

said the plurality "argues that a challenge to a conclusive presumption must rest
,on substantive' 56rather than procedural due process."' 5 5 He opined, "This is
simply not so.'
Since Michael H., the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed permissible
state marital presumptions.' 57 While under California law at the time of Michael
H, either Carole or Gerald could have challenged the marital presumption within
two years of Victoria's birth (though Carole would have needed Michael's
cooperation), the high court has not said what-if any-federal constitutional
guidelines operate if either spouse/parent challenged the presumption over an
objection by the other spouse/parent. 58 It has also not said whether a law
allowing challenges only within 30 days of birth, or for as long as 18 years after
birth, would be valid. 159 It has not said whether any time period for challenge by
the husband/presumed father can be tolled for reasons like maternal deceit or lack
of knowledge. 60 The Court has also not indicated whether Michael could have
challenged the presumption under the Lehr decision if Carole and Gerald had
wished to raise Victoria as co-parents after a separation, if not a divorce, shortly
after Victoria's birth, 16 1 as they did, in fact, separate in October 1981 (when
Gerald left
the California marital home for New York without Carole or
62
Victoria).

152. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

153. Id.at 153.
154. Id.at 145. In dissent, Justice White articulated a similar criticism. Id. at 160 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("IT]he facts of this case satisfy the Lehr criteria, which focused on the relationship

between father and child, not on the relationship between father and mother.").
155. Id. at 153.
156. Id.
157. A Westlaw search of "state marital presumptions" reveals no Supreme Court cases

addressing the issue since MichaelH.
158. See generally MichaelH., 491 U.S. 110.
159. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
160. Id.at 143.
161. Id.
162. Id.at 114. The U.S. Supreme Court has also remained silent when states create two
paternity presumptions favoring two different men at or around birth for a single child, or how such
dual presumptions should be resolved in support or custody litigation. For cases where a choice
between the men must be made, see, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2004) (two presumed
fathers in a custody dispute, one married and one unmarried to the mother); Kevin Q. v. Lauren W.,
95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (two presumed fathers, one married and one
unmarried to the mother); GDK v. State, 92 P.3d 834, 835 (Wyo. 2004) (same); In re KianaA., 113
Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (two presumed fathers, neither married to the mother at
a time relevant to a paternity presumption); and State v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (Wyo. 2001)
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The U.S. Supreme Court has also provided no guidance on what would be
permissible state law regarding legal paternity had Carole's journey ended
differently. For example, it did not indicate whether California law could have
allowed Gerald to be stripped of his parental rights by Carole and Scott,
assuming Scott was willing to assume fatherhood under law. 163 Could Carole,
Scott, and Victoria ever constitute a household of unmarried parents and child?
Could Scott prevail where Michael, the biological father, acknowledges genetic
ties, but then immediately seeks voluntary termination of any interests?
Further, given the parent-child relationship between Michael and Victoria,
could the state law ever allow Michael to resurrect his Lehr opportunity interest
if Carole and Gerald separated or divorced? 164 If so, would Carole's assent be
needed? Similarly, upon separation or divorce, are there circumstances under
which Gerald's new love, Marilyn, could attain Lehr interests? Recall that the
New York adoption law operative in Lehr bestowed notice rights on men who
married the mothers before the child was six months old, as well as men who
lived "openly" with the children and mothers while holding themselves out as the
66
fathers.165 Could women use such paternity statutes to urge equality demands?1
There are obviously many questions that were left open by the Court.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEHR FOR ADOPTIONS
Since Lehr and Michael H., the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed Lehr by
rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal laws differentiating between the
maternity and paternity standards for establishing the natural parents of children

born of sex. In Nguyen v. INS in 2001, the Court upheld different modes of
proving maternity and paternity in order to secure U.S. citizenship for a child
born outside the country. 67 Otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court has been silent
on the paternity opportunity interests for unwed natural fathers of children born
of sex to both unwed and wed mothers.168 As a result, state adoption laws on
(two men with marital paternity presumption, though neither wished to rear the child: one was
married to the mother at the time of conception; the other was married to the mother when she was
in her second trimester). For cases recognizing "dual paternity," see Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847
(La. 1989), and TD. v. MMM, 730 So. 2d 873 (La. 1999).
163. See MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 110.
164. See, e.g., In re S.D., 906 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898-99 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2010) (reinstating
biological father's parental rights when no adoption followed).
165. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251 (1983).
166. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (paternity
statute used to find parenthood in woman who did not give birth), aff'd on other grounds, 117 P.3d
690 (Cal. 2005); Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 309-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting
paternity statute claim by one woman (wife of child's father) as there was already a mother and
father); Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 971 (R.I. 2000) (two women partners "involved with
paternity" under the Rhode Island statute).
167. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001). Many state laws differentiate between natural
mothers and fathers of children born of sex. Thus, in some states only fathers can consent prebirth
to adoptions of their later born children. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1106 (West 2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.070 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-3-604 (West 2010).
168. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58.
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legal paternity of unwed fathers vary considerably. 69 The constitutional interests
of men and women not genetically tied to potentially adopted children whom
they have actually parented also remain uncertain. 17° The varied state law
guidelines involve such doctrines as psychological parenthood, 17 virtual
parenthood, 72 de facto parenthood,1 73 parenthood or 176no parenthood by
estoppel,

174

175

in loco parentis,

and contractual parenthood.

After Lehr, in adoption settings some unwed genetic fathers have a real
"opportunity for a meaningful relationship" with their children, while many
others have little, if any opportunity. 77 Unwed fathers often need to assert
parental opportunities rather quickly under largely uncertain state law in order to
thwart adoptions of their biological offspring.178 Unwed mothers generally have
no obligation to inform prospective fathers of pregnancies or of the post-birth
79
whereabouts of offspring, even when the fathers are interested in parenting.
Mothers also may have no duty to inform the fathers of adoption proceedings
after the mothers learn that the fathers are interested in parenthood.' U As well,
unwed fathers might be foreclosed from pursuing legal paternity in adoption
cases if they fail to comply with technical statutory requirements, such as
169. There are occasional federal statutes unifying all state practices. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 522
(2006). The Servicemember's Civil Relief Act (SCRA) tolls the civil suit limitations period against
those in military service. See also In re Adoption of W.C., 938 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010). SCRA applies to adoption cases under state law, so its tolling provisions must be used in
considering whether genetic father's consent to adoption was required.
170. Nor has the Supreme Court "had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship." Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974.
172. See, e.g., In re a Paternity Proceeding, 906 N.Y.S.2d 865, 865 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2010).
173. See, e.g., In re Shanaira C., 1 A.3d 5, 19 (Conn. 2010) (intervention by child's father's
girlfriend in a custody case because she cared for the child for two years).
174. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 2010) (holding former samesex partner of mother, with civil union status, can estop mother from denying former partner's
parental relationship); In re Juanita A. v. Mark, 930 N.E.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. 2010) (holding
biological father can assert equitable estoppel defense in paternity action by mother "where another
father figure is present in the child's life"); Wanda M. v. Lawrence T., 915 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (noting estoppel operates to designate a man as a father because he held
himself out as the father).
175. See, e.g., K.D. v. E.S.H., 990 A.2d 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
176. See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 503 (N.C. 2010) (natural parent who
surrenders custody to nonparent can lose childrearing right; child custody then determined by
child's best interests); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1997) (same). But see In re
T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (holding absent adoption, wife is not
legal mother of husband's biological child bom to a gestational carrier though wife and husband
"arranged for the in vitro fertilization").
177. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
178. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1983).
179. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(F) ( 2010) (stating sex with the mother "is
deemed to be notice to the putative father of the pregnancy"). See generally Shari Motro, The
Price of Pleasure, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 917, 958 (2010) (existing laws give "men almost no
entitlement to be informed of conception").
180. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
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registering with the putative father registry, even if they undertook similar, or
perhaps more significant, acts such as providing pre-birth support, holding the
children out in the community as their own while parenting, or suing for
custody. 181 Form can prevail over substance. The "sheerest formalism"
can
82
negate legal paternity for an unwed genetic father early in a child's life.
Further, Lehr suggests that an unwed genetic father like Jonathan may be
afforded very little time to seize his constitutional opportunity to assume
fatherhood before an adoption proceeds. While the facts of Lehr included a
period of years between birth and the attempt to assert the unwed genetic father's
rights, the New York statute would have foreclosed Jonathan's right to any notice
or chance to be heard in Jessica's adoption even if the adoption was pursued days
after Jessica's birth, 183 and even though Jonathan had visited Lorraine in the
hospital and likely was recognized as the father by Lorraine during her
pregnancy. Under the prevailing New York statute, 184 his name was not listed on
the putative father registry. Further, his "cohabiting" with Lorraine during her
pregnancy would likely not be the same as living "openly" later with Lorraine
and Jessica,
conduct which Jonathan obviously could not undertake on his
18 5

own.

Lehr not only demonstrates barriers to paternity for certain genetic fathers
whose offspring are subject to adoption, but also how certain non-genetic fathers
can achieve paternity status in adoptions for children born to unwed mothers.
The New York statute in Lehr would have recognized legal paternity, during the
adoption, for the man living "openly" with Lorraine and her child and holding
himself out in the community as the "child's father."'' 86 Therefore, a man like
Scott, the third man involved with Carole in Michael H., can hold himself out as
a father even though he is not the genetic father, actual or presumed. 87 For all
practical purposes, there can be a de facto adoption by a nongenetic father invited
into the mother's family by her without any governmental oversight, and thus
without an inquiry into the child's best interests or parental fitness. How would
Lehr have been decided if Lorraine and Richard established a home together a
few days after Jessica's birth and had never married? If Lorraine later wished to
place Jessica for adoption, after she and Richard separated, Richard seemingly
would be entitled to notice. Jonathan, though, would not be entitled to notice
regardless of the fact that he continued to search for Jessica with a private
detective and his whereabouts were perhaps known by Lorraine.
Over twenty five years have passed since Lehr. The "sheerest formalism"
and maternal choice continue to thwart many genetic fathers seeking legal
fatherhood in adoptions. Unwed fathers still lose their children due to their
ignorance of putative-father-registry laws and to applications of adoption laws
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id

Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 250-52.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (a) (McKinney 1977).
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-52.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (a).
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114 (1989); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-52.
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familiar to very few, even attorneys practicing family law. A few cases and
statutes illustrate these issues.

A.

IllustrativeAdoption Cases

In May 2010, the Utah Supreme Court decided In re Adoption of T.B. 8'
T.J.M., a juvenile, lost his daughter, T.B., to an adoption by the parents of A.B.,
also a juvenile and the natural mother of T.B. 189 The child was conceived during
a sexual relationship between T.J.M. and A.B.' 9"
Before birth, T.J.M. sought to parent T.B. As the court noted:
The putative father was aware of the pregnancy and made attempts to obtain
receipts from the natural mother and her parents so that he could assist with prenatal
medical expenses. He also requested that the natural mother sign a release allowing
him access to T.B.'s medical information so that he could monitor T.B.'s progress
19
1
during the pregnancy. The natural mother and her parents refused these requests.
After T.B.'s birth on February 7, 2007, T.J.M. continued to pursue parenthood.
As noted by the court:
On the day T.B. was born, the natural mother, despite having promised the putative
father that she would coordinate with him to allow him to be present at T.B.'s birth,
registered in a different hospital than originally planned as a "silent patient." The
putative father was nevertheless able to locate the room and visited T.B. and the
natural mother on the day T.B. was born. T.B.'s maternal grandparents, who were
present in the hospital room during the putative father's visit, disapproved of his
association with T.B., and T.B.'s maternal grandfather offered the putative father a
"$120,000 walking ticket" if he would depart from T.B.'s life. The putative father
characterizes this as an offer to pay him off; the grandfather claims he192was merely

calling his attention to the expenses he could avoid by not raising T.B.
193

T.J.M. declined the maternal grandfather's offer.
T.J.M. continued to have contact with T.B., spending "parent-time with
94
[her] for three to five hours, two times a week, usually at his parents' home."',
He also had family pictures taken and held a baby shower. T.J.M. or his parents
would sometimes take T.B. to daycare and later coordinated daycare with A.B.'s
parents. 95 T.J.M. "also purchased child care supplies so that
96 when he was with
T.B. he, or his parents, would be able to care for her needs."'
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1026 (Utah 2010).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027-28.
Id.
Id.
at 1028.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, T.J.M. lost his daughter to the adoption by the maternal
grandparents. 197 "Shortly after T.B.'s birth, and unbeknownst to [T.J.M.]., [A.B.]
and her parents initiated adoption proceedings.' 98 "The natural mother's parents
... filed a petition to adopt T.B. on February 23, 2007-sixteen days after T.B.
was born." 9 "On April 2, 2007, the natural mother consented to the adoption
and relinquished her parental rights. 2 °°
"On June 20, 2007, [A.B.]'s parents informed [T.J.M.] that they were in the
process of adopting T.B. and that the adoption would extinguish his parental
rights."20 1 "Approximately one month later, on July 18, 2007, [T.J.M.] filed a
Verified Petition for Order of Paternity, Custody and Child Support..., naming
[A.B.] as a defendant., 202 "After July 29, 2007, just over a week following
[T.J.M.]'s filing of his paternity action, [A.B.] and her parents refused to allow
[T.J.M.] to have any further contact with T.B. The adoption decree was entered
on August 16, 2007. "2o3
As with Jonathan Lehr, T.J.M. lost his child because he failed to follow the
statutory requirements regarding putative father registration that trigger a right to
notice and participation in an adoption. Under Lehr, T.J.M. was found (in a 3-2
decision) not to have developed a "substantial" or "enduring" parent-child
relationship, especially as he never exercised "actual or legal custody., 20 4 The
dissent, while acknowledging there had been no registration, found that "short of
strict compliance with our statutory mandates, it is difficult to imagine what
additional measures the father could have undertaken
to secure a constitutionally
20 5
protected parent-child bond with his daughter.,
Interestingly, T.B. was just over six months old when she was adopted via a
proceeding commenced when she was 16 days old.2 °6 Had the maternal
grandparents proceeded later, T.J.M. might have prevailed.20 7 The Utah
Adoption Act provides that, for a child placed with adoptive parents more than
six months after birth, consent of an unmarried biological father is required if the
father "developed a substantial relationship with the child," presumably before
placement. 208 Furthermore, that provision is inapplicable where the father "was
20 9
prevented" from such development by "the person ... having lawful custody.
By contrast, when a child is under six months when placed with adoptive parents,
"consent of an unmarried biological father is not required unless, prior to the time
197. Id.
198. In re the Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1028 (Utah 2010).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1040 (Nehring, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1028.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121 (1)(a) (West 2010).
Id. § 78B-6-121(1)(a)(i).
Id. § 78B-6-121(2)(a).
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the mother executes her consent for adoption," the father initiates a paternity
case, files an affidavit with a court promising to pay child support, and files a
notice in a state registry as to the paternity case. 2 r° So, with no putative father
registry filing, a father like T.J.M., whose child is placed for adoption early in
life, must act very, very quickly. A mother can execute a consent to adoption
shortly after birth.211 When an older child (over six months) is placed for
adoption, a father like T.J.M. has had at least six months to develop a
"substantial" and "enduring" parent-child relationship and can even seek
visitation/custody with no such preexisting relationship if he was "prevented"
Here, the age of the child/infant placed for adoption
from parenting.'
determines the extent to, and manner in, which a Lehr interest is vested in an
unwed natural father.
The T.B. case is quite similar to two 2010 Ohio Supreme Court cases in
which the outcomes were very different. In In re Adoption of G. V., the alleged
biological father, Benjamin, timely registered with the Ohio Putative Father
Registry as to any child born of his consensual sex. 213 G.V., his child from such
sex, was born on October 29, 2007 and placed shortly after birth with Christy and
Jason Vaughn, who filed an adoption petition on January 16, 2008.214 Benjamin
filed an action to establish paternity in the juvenile court on December 28,
2007.215 The probate court stayed 216the adoption proceeding pending the juvenile
Ultimately, the Ohio juvenile court named
court's determination of paternity.
Benjamin the father on March 17, 2009.217
Pursuant to Ohio statutes, an adoption can proceed without the consent of a
father or a putative father who "without justifiable cause" fails to provide "more
than de minimis contact" or support for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding either the filing of the petition for adoption or the placement of the
minor in the home of the petitioner seeking to adopt. 218 According to the
appellate court, a father's one year period to demonstrate communication or
support (lest he forfeit his right to veto an adoption) did not begin until one year
after his paternity has been established. 219 The appeals court affirmed the trial
court, declaring that parentage issues pending in juvenile courts at the time of the
adoption petition effectively bar probate courts from proceeding with

210. Id.§ 78B-6-121(3).
211. Id.
212. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(1), (2) (West 2010); In re Adoption ofT.B., 232 P.3d 1026,
1035 (Utah 2010).

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

In re Adoption of G.V., 933 N.E.2d 245, 246 (Ohio 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A) (West 2010).
In re G. V, 933 N.E.2d at 246-47.
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adoptions.22 ° The Ohio Supreme court affirmed, preserving Benjamin's paternal
opportunity interest.22'
The "sheerest formalism" might be said to distinguish Benjamin from
T.J.M. and Jonathan, as Benjamin was the only one to file with the putative
father registry.222 However, the Ohio Supreme Court223indicated that this was not
crucial in a companion case, In re Adoption of P.A. C.
In P.A.C., Gary was the biological father of P.A.C., who was born in July of
he5 time, the mother, Susan, was married to Jeremy.2 25 In fact,
2005. 224 At the
Jeremy was listed as the father on P.A.C.'s birth certificate.226 In August 2005, a
DNA test showed Gary to be the biological father.2 27 Susan was divorced from
Jeremy in November 2005 and married Kevin on April 13, 2007.228 On April 20,
2007, Kevin filed a petition to adopt P.A.C. 229 As in G. V, the Ohio high court
held that staying the adoption proceeding was appropriate pending a
2 0 Gary, as did Benjamin, filed a parentage
determination of Gary's paternity. 230
action before the filing of any adoption petition. 23' But unlike Benjamin, Gary
did not register with the Ohio putative father registry.232 Nonetheless,
the Ohio
233
Supreme Court preserved Gary's paternity opportunity interest.

So, genetic ties do not always yield paternity under law even when a child
is born to an unmarried woman (or girl) as a result of consensual sex and even
when the child otherwise has no father under law at birth. This is troubling
because, in the United States, public policyr clearly desires that fathers be
designated at birth for nearly all children.2 3 Positive paternity tests do not
always prompt legal paternity, sometimes due to the "sheerest formalism" or the
prevention of child-parent contacts. Children, at times, can be denied fathers at
birth where the children's best interests are never considered. By not allowing a
Jonathan Lehr or a T.J.M. to participate in an adoption, it will not be known

220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

In re G.V., 2009-Ohio-6338, 2009 WL 4447562, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
In re G. V., 933 N.E.2d at 246.
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 275 (1983).
See In re Adoption of P.A.C., 933 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ohio 2010).

Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 237.

233. In re Adoption of P.A.C., 933 N.E.2d 236, 236 (Ohio 2010). See also Heart of Adoptions,
Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla. 2007) (holding paternity case filing on day child was born

prompts standing for genetic father in an adoption proceeding though there was no use of the
putative father registry).

234. Jeffrey A. Parness, New FederalPaternityLaws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the
Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 60 (2006) [hereinafter Parness, Federal
PaternityLaws].
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whether a Jessica or a T.B. would likely have benefitted from a relationship with
her genetic father.
B.

IllustrativeAdoption Statutes

The Utah and Ohio cases suggest significant interstate and intrastate
variations in judicial decisions regarding state adoption laws.235 There are also
such as an Indiana statute declaring that a
differences in the state statutes,
pending paternity suit does not relieve a putative father of the duty to file with
23
There are other important differences, such as
the putative father registry. 237
adoption laws requiring mothers to disclose the identities of the putative fathers
before they may place their children for adoption. For example, in Connecticut,
adoption petitions "shall set forth with specificity ... the names, dates of birth
and addresses of the parents of the child, if known, including the name of any
putative father named by the mother." 238 Delaware law, on the other hand,
allows a mother to opt out of identifying possible father(s); doing so, however,
allows some biological fathers later opportunities to contest adoptions.23 9
By contrast, in Alabama, mothers need not disclose the identities of the
fathers. 240 In Arizona, "the fact that the putative father had sexual intercourse
235. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Utah 2010). Utah's adoption
scheme varies depending on age of the child placed for adoption under UTAH CODE ANN.
section 78B-6-121(1).
236. Significant statutory differences in state adoption laws do not necessarily implicate Lehr,
including when parental rights may be ended, even if mothers and fathers are treated differently.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1106 (West 2011) ("A mother whose consent to the termination
of parental rights is required may execute a consent only after the child is born. Consent by the
father or presumed father may be executed either before or after the child is born."); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 127.070 (West 2011) ("All ... consents to adoption executed ... by the mother before
the birth of a child or within 72 hours after the birth ... are invalid .... A ... consent to adoption
may be executed by the father before the birth ... if the father is not married to the mother."); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-3-604 (West 2011) (A man can consent to adoption before or after birth,
while a mother can consent "at any time after the child is born but not sooner."). These differences
are reasonable. As only women experience pregnancies, only their "relationships" with their future
children are sufficiently "enduring" (per Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)). Only women are subject to physical and emotional change due to pregnancy.
Genetic fathers are less likely to experience changed relations with future offspring, as their
physical relationships do not change. Within a single state there also can be statutory differences
between different types of adoption, like stepparent and non-stepparent. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-2136(d), (h) (West 2011).
237. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-5-6 (West 2011).
238. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45A-715(b) (West 2011).
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 107(A)(e) (West 2011).
240. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-7 (2011) (Adoption law neither requires nor encourages the mother
to disclose the identity of the father: "[t]he putative father if made known by the mother or is
otherwise made known to the court provided he complies with Section 26-IOC-1 and he responds
within 30 days to the notice he receives under Section 26-10A-17(a)(10)."). See also IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 16-1501 (A)(4) (West 2011) ("[A]n unmarried mother has a right to privacy with regard to
her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the identity of an
unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to
volunteer information to the court with respect to the father.").

250
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with the mother is deemed to be notice to the putative father of the pregnancy"
and of possible adoption proceedings.24 1 In Florida, a biological father, by
engaging "in a sexual relationship with a woman, is ...on notice
that a
242
pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur.,
Some American state adoption laws can necessitate significant
investigations into the identities and whereabouts of putative fathers before
adoptions. In Vermont, a court will make "every reasonable effort" to identify
the unknown biological father.243 In Arkansas, a court "shall appoint an attorney
ad litem who shall make a reasonable effort to locate and serve notice upon" an
individual in an adoption case who is entitled to notice but has not yet been
located.244 In some states, searching for the putative father is the duty of the
party who petitions for adoption, typically either the mother or the state. In
Connecticut, when the whereabouts of a putative father is unknown, "the
petitioner shall diligently search for any such parent or putative father ...[and]
shall file an affidavit with the [adoption] petition indicating the efforts used to
locate the parent or putative father.', 245 A petitioner who246seeks an adoption in
Texas must exercise "due diligence" to identify the father.
No such investigation is necessary in Indiana.247 There, a father who has
not registered with the state putative father registry within 30 days of the child's
birth, or before an earlier filing of either a petition to adopt or to terminate a
parent-child relationship between child and mother, is not entitled to notice
unless the mother discloses the name or address of the putative father to the
attorney or the agency arranging the adoption.248 The "filing of a paternity action
by a putative father does not relieve the putative father from the: (1) obligation of
registering; or (2) consequences of failing to register" with the putative father
registry. 249 Nor does a rebuttable presumption of paternity, created by a father
who "receives the child into the man's home" and "openly holds the child out as
the man's biological child," relieve the putative father from the obligation of
registering or the consequences of failing to register with the Indiana putative
father registry.2 50 Finally, in Indiana a "putative father's failure to register not
only waives his right to notice of the adoption but also irrevocably implies his
consent. '' 251 A putative father who thus implies consent "may not challenge the
adoption or establish paternity. 252 Even fathers in Indiana who are entitled to
notice, because they registered as putative fathers, forfeit their rights to veto
241. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(F) (2011).
242. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088 (1) (West 2011).
243. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-404(a) (West 2011).

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-212(a)(5)(A) (West 2011).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45A-715(c) (West 2011).
TEX.FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(f) (West 2011).
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-4-6 (West 2011).
Id.
Id.§ 31-19-5-6.
Id.§ 31-14-7-2; § 31-19-5-6.
In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind.Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
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adoptions if they do not respond to adoption notices within 30 days of service of
process when the children are over a year old.253 Finally, a failure to register or
take responsibility for parenthood is often not excused when caused by ignorance
of pregnancy, or even deceit. 4
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEHR

IN OTHER SETTINGS

While Lehr and Michael H. involved two different instances of nonmarital
children in adoptions, their analysis of federal constitutional paternity
opportunity interests have been or could be applied in other settings. There is
likely no good reason why protected interests in forming "significant" parentchild relationships should only be afforded to certain natural fathers whose
children are placed for adoption. As noted, American states generally have
public policies favoring one legal father and one legal mother at birth for
nonmarital children born of sex.
Most nonmarital children, born in or outside
of marriages, will never be placed for adoptions.256
So where else, beyond adoption, might assessments of "custodial, personal,
or financial" relationships between nonmarital children and their genetic fathers,
and perhaps others, be constitutionally necessary? 257 What do state laws now say
about the prerequisites for such relationships, whether or not compelled
constitutionally?
These constitutional questions have relevance for such areas as safe haven,
custody/visitation, child support, tort, and inheritance. 8 The first three often
involve child-rearing interests in nonmarital children, thus implicating Lehr and
Michael H.259 In the latter two settings, typically only money is at issue.26 °

253. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-5-12 (West 2011). To be entitled to notice of an adoption, "a
putative father must register with the state department of health under section 5 of this chapter not
later than: (1) thirty (30) days after the child's birth; or (2) the earlier of the date of the filing of a
petition for the: (A) child's adoption; or (B) termination of the parent-child relationship between
the child and the child's mother; whichever occurs later." Id.
254. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 99-101 (S.D. 1996) (reviewing cases).

255. Parness, FederalPaternityLaws, supra note 234, at 60.
256. Robin F. Wilson & W.B. Wilcox, Bringing up Baby: Adoption, Marriage and the Best
Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 883, 884 (2006).
257. In neither Lehr nor Michael H. did the court limit due-process parental opportunity
interests to adoptions. See Pamess, Out of Control Paternity Schemes, supra note 5, at 655
(applying Lehr to safe haven and paternity acknowledgment schemes).
258. Reunification services (where children have been removed by the state, but parental rights
are not yet lost) are another setting in which assessments of relationships between non-genetic
fathers and children are necessary. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl T., No. F055571, 2009 WL 866855, at
*1, *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009); In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
259. See generally Wolfe v. Stevens, 309 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009); J.S.A. v.
M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 239 (I11.2007); Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 815, 816 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970).
260. See, e.g., In re Estate of Perez, 330 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1972).
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In all settings, the guidelines on paternity opportunity interests, and other
26
Indeed,
possible legal parentage, differ both intrastate and interstate.
262
Recall that under
guidelines can differ within a single setting in a single state.
the Utah adoption scheme in TB., the guidelines varied depending upon the age
nesaei in
teeaevrain
263 Similarly, there
are variations interstate
of the child placed for adoption.
Assuming
safe haven or custody/visitation settings depending upon age.
Lorraine never married Richard, should Jonathan still be denied any chance for
visitation with or custody of Jessica simply because he failed to register his sex
with Lorraine pre-birth, at birth, or shortly after birth? 265 Should Jessica's age at
the time when Lorraine seeks to abandon her with 2the
66 state (via a safe haven
law), or when Jonathan seeks visitation, be important?
In examining varying male parentage issues outside of adoption, it is
helpful to ask, assuming the paternity opportunity of a genetic father like
Jonathan Lehr was not timely exercised, might such an interest be revived? For
instance, had Lorraine and Richard divorced after the adoption petition was filed
but not granted, with Richard withdrawing his request to adopt, might Jonathan
then be entitled to a renewed chance to secure visitation? Or, might Jonathan
then only to be entitled to parent if Lorraine sought child support?
A.

Safe Havens

Under American state statutes, varying peoples (like mothers or parents)
may anonymously abandon infants or very young children by placing them in
safe havens controlled by public safety entities, such as police, fire, or hospital
personnel. 267 Foster care or adoptions are contemplated for these abandoned
children.2 68 Abandonment is most frequent among young mothers, who often
reveal no information about the circumstances of birth, or about biological or
legally presumed fathers or other family members.269 Safe haven statutes clearly
implicate federal constitutional male parental opportunity (if not child-rearing)

261. See generally In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Utah 2010). Compare N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-22-3(B) (West 2011) (indicating a "hospital may ask the person leaving the infant
for the name of the infant's biological father"), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4) (West 2011)
(indicating that the child placing agency shall not attempt to pursue, search for, or notify the parent,
absent circumstances suggesting abuse or neglect).
262. In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d at 1031.

263. Id.

264. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-22-3(B), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4).
265. See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-50 (1983).
266. See, e.g., Jerry C. v. April H., No. F059797, 2011 WL 439567, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
2011) (Upon consideration of "child's age" and duration of parent-child relationship, a court may
decide to deny a non-genetic father's an action to set aside a signed, voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity.).
267. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L.
REv. 753, 754-55 (2006).
268. Id. at 758.
269. Id. at 789.
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interests, 270 disregarding the federal constitutional protections of the parentage
interests of men in their genetic offspring born of consensual sex with unmarried
women.27 1 When infants are abandoned by their (likely) mothers, 2 typically
those receiving the infants cannot ask for the mother's identification or about the
circumstances of the birth.273 Would abandonments by their (likely) fathers, in
states where either parent is authorized by law to abandon, be comparably
treated, with no inquiries?
State safe haven statutes illustrate how paternity opportunity interests are
foreclosed; that is, how statutory schemes likely "omit many responsible
fathers.,, 2 4 Unlike Michael H., here, biological fathers often lose their childrearing opportunities without any countervailing state interests in preserving
unitary families. 75
A West Virginia statute declares that a hospital taking possession of an
abandoned child from a parent "may not require" the parent to identify himself or
herself and shall "respect the person's desire to remain anonymous. 2766 A New
Mexico statute appears sympathetic to potential lost fathers, but ultimately
provides little help, stating, "A hospital may ask the person leaving the infant for
the name of the infant's biological father or biological mother, the infant's name
and the infant's medical history, but the person leaving the infant is not required
to provide that information to the hospital. 277 In Florida, safe haven procedures
seemingly include requirements of diligent searches for, and notice to, interested
men. 78 They also allow potential lost fathers certain opportunities to void earlier
parental rights terminations or adoptions where a court finds a person
"knowingly gave false information that prevented the birth parent from timely
making known his or her desire to assume parental responsibilities toward the
minor or from exercising his or her parental rights. 2 79 However, another Florida
provision states that, except "when there is actual or suspected child abuse or
neglect, any parent who leaves a newborn infant ...
and expresses an intent to
leave the newborn infant and not return, has the absolute right to remain
270. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.190(3) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1

(West 2011).

271. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.190(3); W. VA.CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1.
272. For a further exploration of maternal abandonments, see generally Sanger, supra note 267,
at 754-55.
273. Id. at 755.
274. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-64.
275. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
276. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (West 2011). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133623.01(D) (2011) (respecting mother's right to anonymity); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 216B.190(3), 405.075(2) (West 2011) (need to respect mother's "right to remain anonymous");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-8203(3) (West 2011) (No inquiry is made into identity of parent; if parent
is known, the information is to remain "confidential.").
277. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-22-3(B) (West 2011).
278. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4) (West 2011). See also In re Doe, 3 A.3d 657, 662 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (when a mother refuses to reveal, the state nevertheless must investigate
if there is "other information").
279. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(9)(a).
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anonymous and to leave at any time and may not be pursued., 280 Thus, there are
no real opportunities for diligent searches for genetic fathers. By contrast, when
a mother places an older child for adoption in Florida, the proceeding to
terminate all parental rights in anticipation of a later adoption requires judicial
inquiry and, perhaps an adoption entity search, for the father.281 Such a father
includes a man married to the mother, a man who earlier acknowledged paternity,
or a man who cohabitated with the mother at the time of conception.
Too often safe haven laws foreclose genetic fathers from parenting their
own children even though there are no unitary families worthy of state
protection. The Lehr paternity opportunity interest is unfairly denied.
B.

Custody/Visitation

Genetic fathers of children born because of sex with unmarried women who
are not in unitary families typically may exercise their constitutional parental
interests by seeking paternity or custody/visitation orders.283 In these situations,
the parental interests are not as easily lost as they may be in adoptions, where
genetic fathers can lose because of pre-birth or at-birth failure to act.284 In the
absence of a unitary family, must states, per Lehr, recognize more time for
genetic fathers to exercise their rights? 28 5 As well, per Lehr, must states, at least
post-viability, recognize some pre-birth opportunities for prospective fathers to
establish "personal or financial" (if not "custodial") relationships with their
28 7
potential offspring? 286288The U.S. Supreme Court has set minimal guidelines.
State precedents vary.
The recent Illinois case of J.S.A. v. MH. involved a birth mother who
opposed custody or visitation for their non-marital child's genetic father, in part
because he failed to register with the putative father registry.2 89 The genetic
father initiated a paternity suit.29 Only then did the mother's husband, who
280. Id. § 383.50(5).

281. Id. § 63.088(l)-(2).
282. Id. § 63.088(4)-(5).
283. See, e.g., Exparte G.C., Jr., 924 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (Ala. 2005); Wolfe v. Stevens, 309

S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009).

284. See, e.g., Wolfe, 309 S.W.3d at 210 (noting laches did not bar alleged biological father
from pursuing paternity as statute ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-102(b) (West 2011) allows paternity
suits "at any time"). But see Exparte G.C., Jr., 924 So. 2d at 661 (Stuart, J., concurring) (finding a
biological father can lose prima facie right to custody because of a failure to assume childrearing in
a timely manner).
285. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).
286. Id. A few states allow prospective fathers, with unwed prospective mothers, to file
voluntary paternity acknowledgements which can later be used to place the men on birth
certificates. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.304(b) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14.2604(b) (2011).
287. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265-68.
288. Id.
289. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 239-40 (Ill. 2007).
290. Id. at 240.
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married post-birth, file for an adoption. 291 The court rejected the father's failure
92
to register as a putative father as a ground for dismissing the paternity suit.2
The Iowa Court of Appeals examined a case involving a genetic father who
pursued custody and visitation against a birth mother who continued to parent;
the court was asked whether a father who attempts to assert parental rights five
years after birth has intentionally relinquished a known right.
In this case, the
mother's deceit was arguably the cause of the genetic father's delay.2 94 The
paternity and custody/visitation claims were actually considered in the mother's
dissolution proceeding from her husband, the presumed father.2 95 Thus, a
biological father may have more opportunity to assert parental rights where there
is no adoption proceeding shortly after birth and where there is a dissolved
29 This is not surprising given the social policies enunciated in
unitary family.
29
Michael H.
C.

Child Support

Questions about paternity opportunity interests also often surface in child
support suits against men where there were no prior determinations of legal
paternity.298 Support can be pursued by mothers, other guardians of the child, or
governments (often seeking reimbursements for earlier child welfare
payments).2 99 When support is sought, upon a determination of male parentage
under law, based on genetic ties, 300 do the pursued men always have child-rearing
opportunities? If not, is the preclusion based on the father's failure to accept
parenting responsibility, comparable to the failures3 of Jonathan Lehr or T.J.M.?
3 2
Again, there are no U.S. Supreme Court standards, 0 and state practices vary. 0
291. Id.
292. Id. at 247.
293. In re Briggs, No. 07-0730, 746 N.W.2d 279, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008). The
Court's decision is referenced in a "Decision Without Published Opinions" table in the North
Western Reporter.
294. Id. at *4.
295. Id. at * 1.
296. Id. at * 1, *4.
297. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120-30 (1989).
298. See generally Wenerv. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
299. See, e.g., Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
300. At times male child support does not depend upon genetic ties. See, e.g., Wener, 312
N.Y.S.2d at 815 (holding that husband must support child he neither fathered nor adopted, where
husband had agreed at one time to adopt and had treated the child as his own before a marital
separation).
301. In N.E. v. Hedges, the court said:
[T]here are no judicial decisions recognizing a constitutional right of a man to terminate his
duties of support under state law for a child that he has fathered, no matter how removed he
may be emotionally from the child. Child support has long been a tax fathers have had to pay
in Western civilization. For reasons of child welfare and social utility, if not for moral
reasons, the biological relationship between father and his offspring--even if unwanted and
unacknowledged-remains constitutionally sufficient to support paternity tests and child
support requirements. We do not have a system of government like ancient Sparta where
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In many circumstances, men have no legal opportunity to rear the children

they must support.30 3 Even when a biological father's child-rearing opportunities
are wrongfully lost, he is typically not relieved of support obligations. °4
However, equitable principles can limit paternal support duties if there were
serious deprivations of desired custody/visitation rights. 0
A 2003 Ohio case, Still v. Hayman, illustrates how very late requests for
paternal child support are considered by courts even where the money may not
directly benefit the children; when any real chance for exercising parental
guidance by the father has long since passed; and when the father was long
unaware of his own paternity. 6 In Still, Melissa Hayman, then about 15,
became pregnant after a one-time sexual encounter in 1984 with Clyde Still, Jr.,
then about 13.307 During the pregnancy, Clyde asked Melissa if he was the

male children are taken over early in their lives by the state for military service. The
biological parents remain responsible for their welfare. One of the ways the state enforces
this duty is through paternity laws. This responsibility is not growing weaker in our body
politic ... but stronger ....

N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004).
302. See
Upfront
Answers
to
Back
CHILDSUPPORTLAWFIRMS.COM,

Child

Support

Law

in

America,

http://www.childsupportlawfirms.com/topics.cfm/back-child-

support-law.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
303. In In re Adoption of Baby A., the court said:

This case demonstrates that Florida has taken substantially different statutory approaches to
the rights and responsibilities of biological fathers of children born to unmarried mothers
depending upon the issue at stake. In cases of adoption, we wish to minimize unmarried
biological fathers' rights. When the state seeks to declare a child dependent, the unmarried
biological father's rights are guarded in the hopes the father will fulfill his parental
obligations to the child. In cases of child support, especially when the state seeks
reimbursement of welfare payments, we attempt to maximize the unmarried biological
father's responsibilities. Whether Florida needs a unified policy for the rights of such
biological fathers or whether varying policies can coexist is an interesting issue that is raised,
but certainly not resolved, in this case.
In re Adoption of Baby A., 944 So. 2d 380, 395-96 n.21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). For a contrary
authority, see generally Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117 (Ala. 2009). See also In re Beck, 793
N.W.2d 562, 567 (Mich. 2010) (holding that terminating parental rights does not end parental
support obligations); In re Marriage of Cohen, 747 P.2d 363, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)
(simultaneously affirming the trial court's denial of father's right to visitation and the trial court's
denial of father's request to reduce child support payments); In re Ryan B., 686 S.E.2d 601, 609
(W. Va. 2009).
304. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Zercher v. Bankert, 405 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) ("Generally, matters of support are separate and independent from problems of visitation and
custody, and ordinarily a support order must be paid regardless of whether the wife is wrongfully
denying the father's right to visitation.").
305. See, e.g., In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 356-57 (Tenn. 2006) ("Because Mr. P. did not
have the benefits or responsibilities flowing from an adjudication of parenthood, or the rights
flowing from court-ordered visitation, his ability to form a paternal relationship was entirely
dependent upon the willingness of Mr. and Mrs. Y to permit him to do so[;] ... [thus,] it would be
inequitable to require Mr. P to pay retroactive support to Mrs. Y.").
306. Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
307. Id.
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father. 30 8 Melissa responded that the father was a man she met in Arizona while
on vacation. 30 9 No one in Melissa's family, with whom Clyde was friendly, ever
indicated that Clyde was the genetic father.3 10 On March 3, 1985, Melissa bore
Amber.3 ' In 1987, Melissa began receiving public assistance benefits for Amber
through the local Department of Human Services.312 Prior to receiving benefits,
Melissa was required to name Amber's father so that paternity and paternal child
support duties (including reimbursement to the government for the aid it
provided) might be established.31 3 Melissa, knowing Clyde was the father, lied to
the Department, saying Amber's father was Jeff Mills, about whom she had no
information.31 4 315It is unclear what actions, if any, were taken to locate the
fictitious Mills.
In August 2000, when Amber was 15, Amber told Clyde that he was her
genetic father.31 6 In October, 2000, Melissa informed a local Child Support
3 17
Enforcement Agency (CSEA) that Clyde, not Jeff, was Amber's father.
Melissa told the agency that at the time she began receiving assistance, she did
not want to get into trouble so she just picked a name for the father. Melissa also
said that she had not previously disclosed the identity of Amber's father because
Clyde had raped her. 8
Genetic testing showed in November 2000, a 99.98% chance that Clyde
was Amber's biological father.31 9 In December 2000, CSEA issued an
administrative order establishing a parent-child relationship between Clyde and
Amber, in large part to recover past support it had provided for Amber.3 20 Clyde
filed a parentage complaint against Melissa, arguing a paternity order was barred
by laches, as there was a failure to assert paternity for such an unreasonable time
resulting in prejudice; CSEA intervened.3
A hearing proceeded with testimony from Clyde and Donna Anderson, a
CSEA investigator. 322 The trial court then ruled that laches barred the mother's
attempt to establish paternity and to collect child support.323 Since CSEA's rights
to recover from Clyde were derived from Melissa, the court also found laches
barred CSEA.324 The trial court concluded: "Plaintiff, Clyde Still Jr., does not
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753-54.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id.
Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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owe a duty of support for the child, Amber Hayman ...
because he has materially
been deprived of his parental right325in raising his daughter and in having visitation
and other contact with the child.,
CSEA appealed.326 The appeals court first determined that laches generally
should not apply against state entities like CSEA when it would be "contrary to
an ascertainable public interest., 327 It declared "[T]he public should not suffer
due to the inaction of public officials. 32 8 Yet, the court also found that at times
laches might be appropriate, as when a state request for reimbursement is
accompanied by state "delay and prejudice. 3 29
In "the case at hand," the appeals court found a "strong public policy ...
that it is in the child's interest that a parent-child relationship be formed," as well
as a policy dictating that parents, not governments, assume responsibilities "for
the health, maintenance, welfare and well-being" of their children. 330 Because "a
parent-child relationship could be established through court-ordered visitation"
since Amber was still a minor, and thus because Clyde had "the ability to become
involved" in Amber's life, laches was "not applicable. 331 The court found there
was no "material prejudice" to Clyde because between "the ages of 15/2 to 18,
there is still an amount of rearing that must be done. 3 32 Yet, because Clyde had
no chance to parent until Amber was 15 V2, he was not ordered to "pay retroactive
child support for a child he had no knowledge of."3 33 The appeals court found
this was not like a case "where a father chooses not to support his child, the
mother waits years before seeking an enforcement order, and the father claims
that the delay in asserting her right resulted in material prejudice., 334 Rather, it
was deemed "more closely analogous" to a case where a father stops paying child
support because the mother concealed the whereabouts of the child, thus making
it impossible for him to enforce his visitation rights. 335 Clyde's child support
obligations were sustained.336
The appeals court in Still reasoned that a duped dad could be assessed child
support duties long after birth because there was still some child-rearing "that
must be done," and because the genetic father could then begin to parent, as
through "court-ordered visitation. 337 There was no mention of what, if any,

325. Id. at 755.
326. Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
327. Id. at 755.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 755-56.
331. Id. at 756.
332. Id at 757.
333. Id
334. Id.at 758.
335. Id. at 755.
336. Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
337. Id.at 757. Federal Circuit Judge Richard Posner has suggested that even a statutory rapist
who had earlier accepted parenting duties under Lehr might later have a claim to parental rights if
obligated to provide child support. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996).

Winter 2012]

LEGAL PATERNITY

fatherly parenting had been given Amber
Furthermore, there was no guarantee that
opportunity, as Amber's best interest must be
parent Amber for even the short time she was
if, in fact, Clyde raped Melissa.339

for any part of her 15 years.3 38
Clyde would secure a parenting
considered. Clyde's opportunity to
still a minor would likely be barred

Unfortunately at times child support orders obligate men who never had a
chance to accept parenting responsibility and to rear their genetic offspring to pay
support. Child support orders should not always prompt opportunities for
custody or visitation, but they should be preceded by some reasonable
opportunity to accept parentage, at least for nonmarital children.
D.

Torts andInheritance

Legal parentage at the time of pregnancy or birth must also be determined
when certain tort and/or inheritance recoveries are sought by fathers for fatal
injuries suffered by their children prenatally or at birth. 34' Although paternity is
at issue in these instances, without the need to consider possible child-rearing
interests, should legal paternity issues in tort and inheritance be determined like
legal paternity issues in adoption? Should a Lehr analysis operate for male
genetic fathers with no possible opportunity to parent their children, but who
wish to pursue tort or inheritance recoveries for losses of potential or actual
offspring? 341 Further, should those not genetically tied to a child, but who have
actually parented, possess recovery rights, like the adoption notice rights
possessed by those who hold themselves out as parents? Here, there could not be
significant U.S. Supreme Court guidelines, as state laws typically govern these
claims.342 State laws vary on these issues, sometimes recognizing recovery rights
for genetic fathers who could not rear their children under Lehr standards. 34

338. Still, 794 N.E.2d at 753-58.
339. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(1)(F) (West 2011) (stating that in adoption, male
parental rights are terminated where "the birth of the child was the result of the rape of the
mother").
340. See, e.g., In re Estate of Perez, 330 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1972) ("[B]y its very
nature, wrongful death operates as a link to paternity only when the putative father during his
lifetime is proved to have supported the child; without this no damage can be suffered in the
wrongful death.").
341. See, e.g., Valdivieso Ortiz v, Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 10 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting Lehr did not
support a liberty interest of parents to pursue wrongful death claims; despite the Lehr holding "that
the 'intangible fibers that connect parent and child' are 'sufficiently vital to merit constitutional
protection in appropriate cases ... ' it would be inappropriate to extend recognition of an
individual's liberty interest in his or her family or parental relationship to" a parent's claim for the
wrongful death of a child).
342. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (As parens patriae, a state
may restrict parental control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's
labor, and in many other ways.).
343. The result may be unconstitutional as well if the "unitary family" of Michael H. has
independent federal constitutional interests in being free from arbitrary intrusions by nonmembers,
including genetic fathers who lost their Lehr opportunity interests.
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The 2004 New York case of Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting is illustrative,
and troubling. In Caldwell, a son was born to Elsie and Leon Caldwell in
February, 1971.344 The son died at the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001.34 Leon had earlier left Elsie and two sons behind in Philadelphia when he
moved to New Jersey in September, 1972.346 Thereafter, Leon had contact with
his deceased son on only two occasions.347 There was an overnight visit with
Leon when his son was six348 ; and Leon saw his son, but did not speak, when
they attended the funeral of Elsie's mother in January, 1984.349 Evidently, Leon
rejected Elsie's suggestions that he spend more time with his sons. 350 After Elsie
obtained a court order for child support, Leon failed to pay. 35 1 Receiving public
The son who died "was a college
assistance, Elsie raised her two sons alone.352 353
graduate with an ostensibly successful career."
Because the deceased son was unmarried and had no dependents, Elsie filed
a claim for a $50,000 death benefit under New York Workers' Compensation
Law.354 Upon his intervention, Leon was awarded $25,000. 355 The relevant
statute declared that the decedent's death benefit "shall be paid to the deceased's
surviving parents. '356 Four of the five appellate court judges ruled that when a
term such as "parent" does not have a controlling statutory definition, but is clear
and unambiguous, it should be given its usual and commonly understood
meaning. 357 They looked to a legal dictionary, finding parent often means "the
natural father or the natural mother. 3 58 Since Leon's parental rights were never
terminated, the four judges found Leon survived his deceased son under the
Workers' Compensation Law. 359 The judges did recognize that in other statutory
settings, like probate and wrongful death, a parent who has abandoned his
children is expressly disqualified by statutes as a surviving parent.360 The judges
reasoned that in this instance, there was no intent to exclude Leon as a parent as

344. Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting Grp., Inc., 775 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting Grp., Inc., 775 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See id.
at 93.
358. Id.at 93-94.
359. Id.
360. Id.at 93.
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no explicit provision to that effect in the Workers' Compensation
there 36was
1
Law.
The one dissenting judge not only looked to different dictionary
descriptions, but also undertook a different statutory analysis.362 The dissenter
used the axiom that "the legislature is presumed to have intended to do justice,
unless its language compels the opposite conclusion. 36 3
The dissenter determined that justice required there be no award to "those
who abandon their obligations to their children," a determination supported by
the "public policy" expressly articulated in probate and other wrongful death
settings, as well as by "common sense. ' 36 Out of five judges, only one would
deny Leon, the deadbeat dad, recovery.
Fortunately, the Caldwell approach has not been followed everywhere. In
New Mexico in 2003, an appeals court barred wrongful death benefits for a
genetic father who had abandoned his child over a decade before the child's
death in 1986. In Perry v. Williams, the court noted that while the relevant
statute did not expressly say that abandonment precludes recovery (as did the
Probate Code), common law and public policy barred relief.365 The court also
noted that the genetic father had "failed to cooperate in the necessary testing for a
bone marrow transplant," though he was told that his son had cancer, that he was
"one of three possible donors," and that the other two donors did not match.366
By contrast, the law in Kentucky has been articulated to say:
[A] parent may not recover proceeds of a child's estate, nor proceeds of a wrongful
death proceeding, if he has willfully abandoned the child unless he resumed the care
and maintenance of the child at least one year prior to his or her death, or was
complied with Orders requiring
deprived of custody by court ...and substantially
36 7
contribution to the support of the child.
In Kansas, a termination of parental rights in a child during an adoption
to such a child, including their right to inherit
ends "all the rights of birth parents
368
child.
such
through
from or
Criteria to determine paternity in tort and inheritance settings vary by state,
adoption. 369
and are at times different from the paternity criteria followed for

361. Id.
362. Id at 95-96 (Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
363. Id.at 94-95 (Lahtinen, J., dissenting).

364. Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting Grp., Inc. 775 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
365. Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283, 1287 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).

366. Id. at 1285.

367. Calhoun v. Sellers, No. 2008-CA-001311-DG, 2009 WL 3231506, at *2-3 (Ky. Ct. App.
Oct. 9, 2009).
368. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(i) (West 2011).
369. See, e.g., Garza v. Maverick Mkt., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. 1989) ("[l]n a wrongful
death action an illegitimate child need not be 'recognized' in accordance with other bodies of law
not specifically applicable to the Wrongful Death Act.").
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Some states even recognize paternity for the wrongful death of an unborn
child.37 °
VI. PARENTAL OPPORTUNITY INTERESTS FOR THOSE NOT INVOLVED IN SEX?

Before concluding, we consider when a Lehr or Michael H. approach might
include a parental opportunity interest, arising at birth, in nonmarital children
born of sex, but for those who are not involved in the sex.37 1 Constitutional
interests might be recognized for one or both members of a heterosexual or
homosexual relationship who parent the child. At birth or thereafter, these
relationships may need to be marital-like, exhibiting "unitary family"
characteristics. 372 Interests might also be extended to single people not involved
in sex who parent children, perhaps including grandparents, other blood relatives,
and maybe even nonrelatives.
Lehr illustrates how a parental interest might be recognized under state law,
if not federal constitutional law, for one not involved in sex. 373 The New York
statute guiding Jessica's possible adoption by Richard recognized notice rights,
inter alia, for a man who was listed on the putative father registry or who held
himself out in the community as Jessica's father.374 In each setting there is no
guarantee of genetic ties. 375 Might such a non-genetic father ever have a federal

370. See, e.g., Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995) (Missouri
"legislature intended the courts to interpret 'person' within the wrongful death statute to allow a
natural parent to state a claim for the wrongful death of his or her unborn child, even prior to
viability.").
371. Those involved in procreative sex often wish to parent children who often wish or need
their parenting to continue. It has been observed:
[F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the direct cause of his
emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-to-day attention to his needs for
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. Whether any adult becomes
the psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-to-day interaction, companionship,
and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an
adoptive parent or by any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever
his biological or legal relationship to the child me be.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17 (1979).

372. But see In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (Absent adoption,
wife is not the legal mother of husband's biological child though she helped arrange the in vitro
fertilization with husband's aid.).
373. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[Tihe importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way
of life' through the instruction of children." (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977))).
374. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263.
375. The New York statute also recognized notice rights for a man "identified as the father on
the child's birth certificate." While such an identification does not guarantee genetic ties, it at least
requires a good faith belief of genetic ties. See Office of Temp. and Disability Assistance, New
York State Dep't of Health, Form No. LDSS-4418, Acknowledgment of Paternity (rev. Aug. 1998)
("I hereby acknowledge that I am the biological father.").
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constitutional interest in blocking an adoption or in being afforded
Could a state-law parental interest trigger 376a federal
custody/visitation?
constitutional liberty interest where there otherwise would not be one?
Lehr further illustrates how a parental interest at birth might be recognized
in a non-genetic parent as a result of a natural mother's, rather than a man's, acts.
The New York adoption statute in Lehr granted notice rights for a man
377
"identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn statement.
As well, the statute recognized notice rights for a man who "married the child's
mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child. 378 Here too there
is no guarantee of genetic ties. Might such a man ever have constitutional
interests in blocking an adoption or seeking custody/visitation?
Further, as Michael H. illustrates, some parental interests for children born
of sex have been recognized for men who theoretically could have been, but were
in fact not, involved in the relevant sex. 379 Such interests may not always depend
on the significant acts, or the continuing wishes, of mothers, such as in settings
when only men can rebut marital presumptions.
Beyond such men like Gerald, who was able to (and did) father other
children,3 80 might there be additional federal constitutional interests lurking in the
birth of children born of sex? For example, what about an impotent man who
was incorrectly, with maternal knowledge, "identified as the father by the mother
in a sworn written statement," or who "married the mother before the child was
six months old," or who held himself out in the community as the child's father,

376. In contrast to the paternity opportunity interests of unwed genetic fathers under Lehr and
Michael H., where state laws can vary widely, there is less variation in state laws governing the
childrearing interests of those legally recognized as parents. While the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Troxel v. Granville in 2000 serves as a guide, there was no unanimous, or even
majority, opinion. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). However, all Justices
affirmed the principle that every parent recognized under state law has a federal constitutional
"liberty interest ... in the care, custody and control" of her or his child. Id. at 57, 64. For most
Justices, such parental authority limits significantly governmental efforts to override decisions by
parents regarding third-party visitation (or other contacts) with their children. Id. at 57. Thus, the
Troxel court invalidated a state statute allowing "any person" who is not a parent to petition a court
"for visitation rights" with a child "when visitation may serve the best interest of the child." Id. at
63. The statute had been employed by paternal grandparents who, after their son died, were
informed by their granddaughter's mother that the mother wished grandparent visitation be changed
from a "regular" basis to "one short visit per month." Id. at 60-61. The decision to allow visitation
was now up to the mother alone.
Since Troxel, federal constitutional childrearing authority has not yet received a "precise
definition" that was concededly omitted in Troxel. Id. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Lower
federal courts have exercised "considerable restraint," usually limiting their rulings to "the precise
facts of particular cases." Id. at 95-96. Justice Scalia, who dissented in Troxel, lamented that the
decision would likely someday usher in "a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally
prescribed, family law." Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To date, it has not.
377. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 -a(2)(f) (McKinney 2011).
378. Id. § 111-a(2)(g).
379. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128-30 (1989).
380. Id. at 115. After Carole bore Victoria, Carole had at least two more children with her
husband Gerald. Id.
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with at least some maternal support for at least some period of time?38 I Could
federal constitutional child-rearing interests arise for such a man, whether in or
outside of adoption, as long as he established a "significant custodial, personal,
or financial" relationship with the child?
Further, what about a lesbian partner of a mother who, with maternal
consent, was identified as a parent by the mother,3 82 or who married the mother
before the child was six months old, or who held herself out in the community as
the child's second parent? 383 Should it matter if consensual sex led to birth?
Should it matter whether the partner was involved with the mother prebirth?
Increasingly, natural mothers who agree with their same sex partners to rear their
children jointly cannot later object to dual legal parentage when the partnership
(whether or not marital 384) dissolves.
Finally, might any non-partners of mothers, like grandparents, ever attain
federal constitutional child-rearing interests? With maternal consent, there are
some grandparents who rear their grandchildren from childbirth, acting as
parents, and sometimes declaring their parentage in the community. 385 Could
state laws validating such arrangements prompt federal constitutional interests?
Could state laws denying such grandparents
tort recovery rights be invalidated on
38
grounds?
protection,
equal
or
Lehr,
Major hurdles, as well as absolute roadblocks, await nongenetic parents
pursuing federal constitutional parental interests, including the American

381. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l-a(2).
382. See generally Davis v. Swan, 697 S.E.2d 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); In re Mullen, 2011Ohio-3361, 2011 WL 2732258 (Ohio 2011) (Former lesbian partner lost bid for shared legal
custody of child whose conception she planned with biological mother while the two women were
living as a same sex couple.); In re La Piana, 2010-Ohio-3606, 2010 WL 3042394 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010).
383. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 678 (Cal. 2005) (no decision on whether same sex
partner is a presumed parent because she received child into her home and held her out as her
child); Chatterjee v. King, 253 P.3d 915, 918 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
384. See, e.g., K.M., 117 P.3d at 682 (holding that one same sex partner's claim "to be the
twins' mother because the twins were produced from the ova is equal to" the second partner's
"claim to be the twins' mother because she gave birth to them"). Both mothers were legally tied to
each other, due to a domestic partnership, id. at 675, which is significant because the Michael H.
court held that the U.S. Constitution permits states to categorically prefer parents who have "a legal
tie with the mother." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129. The K.M court considered it crucial that the
couple "intended to produce a child that would be raised in their own home," which speaks to the
importance of the "unitary family" that the Michael H. court sought to preserve. K.M, 117 P.3d at
679. The K.M court also found that a statutory presumption, that a father is considered a legal
parent when "he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child," need not apply in same-sex settings where both parents are related to the child by blood. Id.
at 682.
385. Willis v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist., No. 2009-CA-001874-MR, 2010
WL 4137492, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2010).
386. One such law operated in Willis, 2010 WL 4137492, at *3 (holding a grandmother who
raised child from birth cannot sue for loss of consortium or negligent infliction of emotional
distress; while law is "arbitrary," it is not unconstitutional).
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tradition of reserving most family relations matters for state lawmakers.387 At
least where there is some maternal approval, arguably there is a "unitary family"
Scalia, which is a "household of
under the Michael H. analysis by Justice
388
unmarried parents and their children."
So, federal constitutional parentage interests for those not involved in sex
might arise for those involved in a "unitary family." Recall that in Michael ff.,
the married parents, constituting a family, retained custody of a child born of sex
outside the marriage because they agreed to raise the child (as their own?). 389 In
Lehr, could an agreement by Lorraine and Richard to raise Jessica, entered before
marriage, have sufficed to confer upon Richard federal parentage interests? In
Michael H., could an agreement between Carole and Scott (neither the husband
nor the genetic father) to raise Victoria, together with Scott's actual parenting of
Victoria, ever bestow upon Scott federal constitutional parentage interests?
Should the length of time Scott actually parented, or the time when the agreement
was entered, or the child's age, matter? Some state parentage laws, as with
adoption notices, make such distinctions. 390 Generally, how might intended
parentage in the absence of sex prompt federal constitutional child-rearing
interests?
VII. CONCLUSION

Male genetic ties to children born of consensual sex can, but need not,
prompt opportunities for "substantial" federal constitutional child-rearing
interests, at least in adoption settings (and likely elsewhere). States can afford
similar opportunities to men and women without genetic ties but in "unitary
family" relationships. The major U.S. Supreme Court precedents, Lehr and
Michael H., do not directly address parental status at birth outside adoption.
State legislators and judges struggle as a result.
State paternity laws vary intrastate (by context) and interstate (within the
same context). Too often, as with safe haven and adoption notice statutes, states
unconstitutionally deprive many responsible genetic fathers of their paternity
opportunity interests under Lehr. State lawmakers and judges also fail to
consider the constitutional import of, and the social policies underlying, Lehr and
Michael H. in assessing legal parentage at birth for genetic parents outside of
adoption (where substantial child-rearing interests may or may not be involved),
as well as in settings involving nongenetic parents. The "significant custodial,
personal, or financial relationship" 39' between natural father and child, as well as
the preservation of "unitary" families, must be considered in many more legal
parenthood settings in and beyond adoption.
387. See generally Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (finding that the regulation of
domestic relations has historically been regarded as the "virtually exclusive province of the
States").
388. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
389. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989).
390. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (West 2011).
391. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).

